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THE VOW OF POVERTY
AND ITS CIVIL LAW
IMPLICATIONSt
ROMAEUS W. O'BRIEN, 0.

T

HE RELIGIOUS

CARM.*

STATE is a juridical status of persons in the Church in

which the members profess the public vows of poverty, chastity, and
obedience. In virtue of positive legislation of the Church these public
vows are essentially necessary but they are not ends in themselves. They
are mere means whereby the individual is assisted in his pursuit of perfection by the observance of the evangelical counsels. One of these, the
vow of poverty, aims at the acquisition of the virtue of poverty and a
spirit of detachment from temporal goods. Although this virtue and
spirit should motivate and influence the life of every religious, the actual
occasions on which the vow of poverty calls for the observance of precise formalities of law by the subject are not too frequent. Nevertheless,
the proper fulfillment of these demands creates situations where canon
and civil law should be examined in relationship to one another so that
the latter can be utilized for the better fulfillment of the canons. This is
the specific area with which this paper is concerned. The questions to be
examined are not offered as an exhaustive compilation. Rather it is
hoped that they will illustrate the possible relationship of canon and
civil law in matters pertinent to the vow of poverty and that they will be
of service in the solution of actual problems when they arise. When civil
law is called upon to reinforce canonical prescriptions, as it is in these
cases, it is understood to be an area for one competent in questions of
civil law to work towards the fulfillment of the canonical regulations.
Some preliminary facts should be recalled before turning to a consideration of particular problems. In the first place, the vow of poverty itself
should be understood. It is a promise made to God by which a religious,

t Reprinted with permission from 21 THE JURIST 435 (1961).

* Member of the faculty of the Catholic University of America, Associate Editor
of THE JURIST.
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desirous of striving after supernatural perfection, binds himself in accordance with
the particular law of an institute not to accept, use, or dispose of temporal goods
without permission of the lawful superior.1
The canonical restrictions placed upon
the conduct of an individual by the vow of
poverty extend only as far as ownership or
rights derived from it are involved. Consequently, the religious retains reasonable discretionary power in certain instances where
at first appearance the vow of poverty
seems to apply. Thus, for example, he may
refuse to accept a gift whenever he judges
that its refusal can be justified by his own
particular law and the virtue of piety. Or
again, he may, in similar circumstances,
channel a possible gift away from himself
without violation of the vow or virtue of
poverty. This may be done since the vow
of poverty does not oblige one to accept
everything that is offered to him. Prior to
his acceptance of gifts, there is no question of ownership on his part; it is the
exercise of acts of ownership which is regulated by the vow.
The historical evolution of religious law
recognizes a distinction between a solemn
and a simple vow of poverty. They do not
differ intrinsically, but ecclesiastical law
treats them differently. The solemn vow is
generally professed in the older orders
where the individual surrenders the right of
ownership at solemn profession, while the
simple vow is characteristic of religious
congregations where this right is retained
by the individual. Both vows, however,
effectively restrict the individual's right to
use and to administer property. Under the
I Pius IX, litt. ap. Quam maxina, 13 Nov. 1847;
Normae, art. 113; Beste, Introductio in Codicem

(Collegeville, Minn.: St. John's Abbey Press.
1956), ad can. 479, III.

simple vow, the religious retains the radical
right of ownership of property already possessed as well as the right to acquire property. On the other hand, the religious who
professes the solemn vow of poverty surrenders his natural right to possessions so
that he no longer retains a patrimony or
2
the right to acquire one.
The subject of the property of religious
is treated in six canons of the Code. Even
a hasty perusal of them indicates how the
law wishes a religious to disassociate himself permanently from preoccupation with
personal possessions from the time of his
entrance into religious life. At the same
time, the law realistically provides for the
protection of one's patrimony so that it will
be kept intact in case necessity or other
considerations should dictate a return to
the world. Thus canon 568 states that the
novice may not renounce his possessions
after entering the novitiate. He must appoint an administrator to care for them,8
and, if he is a novice in a religious congregation, he is to make a will 4 which cannot
be arbitrarily changed.5 Furthermore, the
patrimony cannot be disposed of or encumbered by the religious in a congregation without special permission. 6 Thus the
canons cover the entire life of the religious
in relation to his personal possessions. In
addition, the law considers him to be incorporated into a new family by religious
profession and, consequently, whatever he
acquires as a religious is acquired by the
7
institute.
2

Beste, loc. cit.; Wernz-Vidal, De Religiosis (Ro-

mae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1933), nn. 327-330.
3 Can. 569, § 1.
4Can. 569, § 3.
5 Can. 580, § 3.
6 Can. 580, § 3; 583, 1.
7 Can. 580, § 2.
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The canons also distinguish between the
rights of those with a simple vow and the
rights of those with a solemn vow. Personal
acquisitions are still possible for the former,
but they must be incorporated into his
patrimonial goods s and ultimately disposed
of by will 9 if the religious perseveres in his
vocation. Since the solemnly professed religious renounces the right of ownership,
the law allows him to dispose freely of his
patrimonial goods in the two months before
solemn profession. 10
In the framework of these preliminary
points of law certain problems involving
the application of civil and canon law remain to be considered. Both laws are concerned with these matters, namely, the
appointment of an administrator for temporal goods, the formulation of a last will,
the renunciation of property before solemn
vows, the acceptance of legacies, and contracts for personal services.
Appointment of an Administrator and
Designation of Use for Interest
and Usufruct
In the course of the novitiate, a novice
is to appoint an administrator for his patrimony and, also, to arrange for the disposition of the interest or income from his
estate. 1 Both actions are to be quasipermanent so that a subsequent change is
only permissible for a good reason and
with the authorization of the general superior.1 2 In making these prescriptions, however, the canon allows broad discretionary
authority to the individual in so far as the
choice, manner of appointment, and instructions to the administrator are con8 Can. 580, § 1.
11Can. 569, § 3.
10 Can. 581, § 1.

I1 Can. 569, § 1.
12 Can. 580, § 3.
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cerned. In allowing such freedom, it seems
only reasonable to expect that the canon
will be observed in such a way that the
civil law will insure its fulfillment when a
notable sum is involved.
N o specific value is established in the
law whereby one can determine that a particular amount of possessions is to be considered patrimony. A refinement of the
concept is nevertheless possible in the light
of the purpose of the patrimony: it is intended to be a means of support for the
religious if he fails to persevere in his vocation. It follows that a sum suitable for
this purpose should be considered patrimony. Thus, for example, an amount of
money regarded as a suitable charitable
subsidy under canon 643, § 2, for a religious returning to the world can be taken
as a norm for determining what value constitutes patrimony. Such a sum should,
therefore, be turned over to an administrator.
Although the law does not prescribe how
an administrator is to be appointed, there
is greater need for this to be accomplished
in accordance with the regulations of civil
law as the value of a patrimony increases.
Informal agreements with a friend, a member of the family, or the community itself
may be acceptable when the patrimony is
of minor value, but when its value is notable, informality should not be tolerated.
The purpose of the law is twofold: the
preservation of the temporal possessions
of the religious and the elimination of future preoccupation regarding his possessions. Reasonable efforts necessary, therefore, to reinforce the canon with the
statutes of civil law are clearly indicated
whenever the value of the patrimony is
notable.
In referring to a patrimony as notable,
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the term notable is not employed in the
comparatively restricted meaning adopted
by authors in matters of justice.1 3 Rather,
it is used in the sense in which it would
characterize an estate that would be considered notable in the world today, due
consideration being given to current economic conditions. Thus "the reasonable
man" of civil lawyers might consider as
notable an estate valued at $5,000 since it
would be capable of producing at normal
interest rates an annual yield of considerable value to him. Less arbitrary, perhaps,
and certainly more persuasive to the canonist, is a norm drawn from the decree of the
Sacred Congregation of Religious regarding alienation of religious assets. For the
United States of America, the value of
$5,000 was established as a limit beyond
which alienation could not be made without an apostolic indult.14 The reason for
requiring the indult is the safeguarding of
the assets of religious institutes. If assets
appraised at $5,000 in value are considered in such a way as to require the additional safeguard of an apostolic indult, it is
logical to conclude that the easily available
protection of civil law should be enlisted
when it is a question of the appointment of
an administrator over a personal estate of
identical value of a religious. The purpose
of such a requirement is to afford an added
assurance by civil authorities that the preservation of the patrimony required by
canon law will be accomplished.
1: Jone-Adelman, Moral Theology (Westminster:
Newman Press, 1956), p. 218; Fanfani, De lure
Religiosoruin (Rovigo: Instituto Padano di Arti
Graphice, 1949), p. 177; Choupin, Nature et
obligations de l'dtat religieux (Paris: Beauchesne,
1927), p. 248.
14 S.C. de Rel., Notification, 29 Jan. 1953 Bouscaren, The Canon Law Digest, Vol. IV (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), p. 203.

The subject is free in his choice of an
administrator."j It may be advantageous in
some respects for the community to be
chosen to fill this role, provided the freedom of choice of the subject is respected
and the patrimony placed in no jeopardy.
A minimum requirement in such circumstances would be that the responsibility of
the community be undertaken under the
authority of the major superior.
The legal instrument to be recommended
for the transfer of administration is the
trust. When this is established with a bank
or trust company as trustee, state law regulates the character of the investments of
such trusts. In addition, the possibility of a
conflict of interests between the community
and the subject is eliminated, while the
need for supervision and direction of the
trustee is eliminated. Finally, there is no
need for concern that a new trustee may
some day have to be chosen in the event
of the trustee's death, since the trustee,
when it is a bank or trust company, is considered to be established in perpetuum. Because of the comparative ease with which
such a civilly acceptable instrument can be
arranged, it certainly can be said that canon
569, § 1, is best satisfied in this way.
Stipulations concerning interest and revenues accruing to the patrimony should be
incorporated into the trust. The trust itself
should be revocable in accordance with the
conditions of canon 580, § 3, on the possibility of the lawful return of the subject to
the world.
It would be reasonable for an institute
to establish a statute or law requiring all
patrimonies to be erected as trusts. Such a
law would be a lex praeter codicem.
If the religious has no patrimony, the
Abbo-Hannan, The Sacred Canons, Vol. I (St.
Louis: The Herder Book Co., 1952), ad can. 569.
1.
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above formalities would be idle transactions. On the other hand, canon 569, § 2,
considers the possibility of a simply professed religious acquiring a patrimony at a
later date; in such an eventuality, the above
remarks would then be applicable, since
the dispositions of canon 569, § 1, are then
to be put into effect.
The Novice and the Will of
Canon 569, § 3
In the course of his novitiate a novice in
a religious congregation is to make a will,' 6
to which a certain finality is attached, for
it may be changed only in accordance with
the formalities of canon 583, 20. This will
should be conformable with the statutes of
civil law in order to safeguard the testator's
17
intentions.
Authors formerly considered the will required in this canon as something necessary, even though it was not recognized by
civil law because the subject was not capas
ble before civil law of making a will.'
Thus, for example, a morally binding will
might fall short of the requirements of civil
law because the testator had not attained
the age required by civil law for making a
valid will. 10 Thus a novice may frequently
16 Can. 569, § 3.
17 Canon 1513, § 2, prescribes that wills which
are made in favor of the Church should be made
in such a way that they are protected by civil
law whenever this is possible. This is a require-

ment to insure the fulfillment of the testator's
intentions, and it seems quite reasonable to apply
it to cases where a religious makes a will.
18 Vermeersch-Creusen, Epitome luris Canonici,
Vol. I (Mechliniae-Romae: H. Dessain, 1949),
p. 530, n. 716; Bouscaren-Ellis, Canon Law, A
Text and Commentary (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1946), p. 270; Beste, Introductio in

Codicem, ad can. 570; Abbo-Hannan, The Sacred
Canons, I, ad can. 569, § 3.
19 A comparison of canons 89 and 1513 reveals
that the canonical age for a valid will is the age

have been called upon to make a will during his fifteenth year. Such a will would
not have been recognized in many of the
states because of the testator's age. In those
states it would have required an amendment by codicil, or would need to have
been rewritten when the subject attained
the age required by civil law in order to be
recognized at civil law.
Canon 569, § 3, remains unchanged
today, but recent responses and jurisprudence indicate a clear and notable departure from the jurisprudence of the past in
this matter. 20 The current practice indicates a new approach to canon 569, § 3,
in regard to those who lack testamentary
capacity before the civil law. 21 Gutierrez,
of the Sacred Congregation of Religious,
states that at present the Congregation regards the will prescribed in canon 569,
§ 3, as a civilly valid will.22 Thus a novice
who lacks testamentary capacity before the
civil law or one who is excused from making a civilly valid will at the time23 has no
of reason. Although the consent of the parent or

guardian is necessary for a minor's will, it is a
requisite for liceity alone (vide Hannan, The
Canon Law of Wills [Philadelphia: The Dolphin

Press, 1935], nn. 513 and following).
20 It seems warranted to observe that the present
practice of the Sacred Congregation of Religious

in this matter appears to support the suggestions
made above that the aid of civil law should be
enlisted in matters which touch upon civil as
well as canon law whenever that aid is conducive
to the proper fulfillment of the canon.
21 Vide Bouscaren-O'Connor, Canon Law Digest,
Supplement (Milwaukee:

Bruce Publishing Co.,

1959), ad can. 569; Gutierrez, Commentarium
pro Religiosis, XXXVII (1958), 56-68.
22 Gutierrez, loc. cit.

A serious inconvenience, such as a notable or
unwarranted expense, could be an excusing cause
in so far as the fulfillment of the canon at the
prescribed time is concerned. It seems that the
23

judgment of the gravity of the excusing cause in
such a case would not be that of the subject but,
rather, that of the proper major superior upon
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obligation to make a will until he can do
so validly before civil law or until the excusing cause ceases. He must, however, do
so as soon as possible after he acquires testamentary capacity or the excusing cause
ceases. In the meanwhile, there is no obligation to make a civilly invalid will since
such a will is also invalid canonically, unless it is made in favor of pious causes.
This new practice in regard to canon
569, § 3, is to be commended highly, and
it is hoped that it will be formulated into
positive law because it applies to a "gray
area" which has been the source of problems in the past.
A notable exception to the application
of the concept of a civilly valid will to
canon 569, § 3, remains with regard to
wills made in favor of pious causes. A
novice who lacks testamentary capacity before the civil law may still make a will in
favor of such causes, and it is canonically
valid and binding in conscience. 24 Obviously, such a will should later be ratified
before civil law when that can be accom2
plished. .
It should be noted that the present practice does not have retroactive force and,
therefore, wills made in the past by those
who lacked testamentary capacity at civil
law were nevertheless valid canonically.
Later, when civil law ratification was necessary, it was a necessary formality to be
performed but the dispositions of the canonically valid will were not to be changed
without fulfilling the formalities of canon
583, 20. Consequently, if a religious desires
whom the responsibility of seeing to the fulfillment of canon 569, § 3, rests. In either case, the
law remains while the obligation to fulfill it is
merely suspended.
24 Can. 1513, § 2; Bouscaren-O'Connor, loc. cit.
25 Can. 1513, § 2.

today to ratify before civil law a will madc
in the past and, at the same time, contemplates a change of beneficiaries in the will,
canon 583, 2', would apply.
Two further observations seem called for
in this consideration of the will of canon
569, § 3.
The will is prescribed for those in a
religious congregation but the law does not
apply to candidates for a religious order,
even though they make profession of simple vows for a period of years before surrendering their right of ownership with
solemn profession. Nevertheless, if a candidate to a religious order possesses a notable
patrimony and is capable of making a
civilly valid will, it is to be recommended
that he do so as a prudential measure to
protect the disposition of his estate. Even
before solemn vows, after he has disposed
of his possessions in accordance with canon
581, a will in favor of his order is to be
recommended as a means of protecting
civilly the rights acquired by the order over
all the possessions a religious will acquire
after his solemn profession.
Finally, it is sometimes stated that unforeseen acquisitions of the future may not
be disposed of here and now in a will. This
is a misconception which lacks foundation
in civil or canon law. Indeed, the novice in
a religious congregation is directed to do
this very thing by canon 569, § 3. Civil law
certainly has no quarrel with this procedure. The will recognized by civil law regards the estate not as it is today but,
rather, as it will be at the time of the death
of the testator. In many states, statutes
exist to the effect that all goods which will
be acquired in the future are implicitly
included under a will. If there be any doubt
about the matter, a residual clause may
always be inserted to cover such goods.
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Reminciation of Possessions before
Solemn Profession
Within the sixty-day period prior to solenm profession a religious is to dispose of
his possessions in view of the renunciation
of ownership implicit in his solemn vow of
poverty. 20 In disposing of his possessions,
he may also renounce anything of value
which he foresees with a reasonable degree
of certitude as coming to him personally.
After solemn profession, all acquisitions
made by him belong to the institute or to
the Holy See, since he lacks the right of
ownership. 7 Even though the subject and
his heirs are morally obligated to see to the
fulfillment of this Church law, an effective
instrument at civil law should be formulated to protect the interests of the institute with regard to future acquisitions by
the subject.
Among the instruments of civil law
whereby the canonical renunciation of possessions can be rendered effective, a contractual agreement between the person and
the institute is highly recommended. A bilateral contract between the subject and the
institute can be entered into whereby ownership of all goods possessed now or at any
future date by the religious are ceded in
consideration for the temporal care and
support of the person by the institute until
the person's death. As proof of consideration on the part of the institute, the contract
should specify that the institute will provide for the person's burial, as well as
expenses connected with it. A clause of this
type may not be especially pleasing to the
delicate sensibilities of some individuals,
but its inclusion is urged as a proof of the
Can. 581; O'Brien, "The Renunciation of Possessions before Solemn Profession," THE JURIST,
XX (1960), 127-158.
27 Can. 582, 2.
26
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consideration given by the institute for the
acquisition from the subject of rights of
such possible magnitude.
A bilateral contract or memorandum of
agreement between the institute and the
religious can be arranged by one competent in civil law. Much is to be said in favor
of this instrument, even though present
good will and a moral obligation to fulfill
the conditions of the canon argue against
the necessity of adopting the instrument.
The contract provides assurance at civil
law that the canon will be fulfilled. It is
enforceable and it practically nullifies past
or future wills which might be presented
against the acquired rights of the institute.
A previous will can have no practical effect
in so far as the contract already disposes
before the testator's death of possessions he
may have acquired. A will postdating the
contract cannot be sustained, since a bilateral contract may not be abrogated unilaterally through a will. The contract,
therefore, is superior to a will for effecting
the transfer of dominion to the institute
since it is immediately operative and enforceable. It should be adopted instead of
waiting until necessity demands the formulation of deeds of conveyance for newly
acquired possessions. The latter procedure
may require repeated actions and may
sometimes be impossible when, for example, a religious is incapacitated. With the
contract, therefore, a maximum of assurance for the fulfillment of canon 581
is achieved with a minimum of civil
28
formalities.
28An example of the type of agreement is
offered here with the understanding that adaptations necessary because of the civil law of the
area should be incorporated into it by one competent in civil law.
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

day
This agreement entered into this
, 19
, by and between
of
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In relation to the subject of renunciation
of possessions bcforc solemn profession,
reference should be made to the possibility
of a conditional renunciation of possessions.9 Perhaps a candidate for solemn
vows possesses a notable patrimony and
hesitates to renounce it absolutely in accordance with canon 581. Fearing that he
may find it necessary to withdraw from
religious life at a future date, he may wish
to renounce his patrimony in such a way
that recovery of it will be possible in that
eventuality. Such a renunciation is readily
possible at civil law through the instrumentality of a revocable trust. The desire
for a similar canonical expedient is by no
means new and was considered by older
canonists under the title of conditional renunciation. In the nineteenth century the
Holy See opposed and rejected the measure
on several occasions and its exclusion under
canon 581 is definite. Even though it seems
desirable and equitable in a particular case,
this type of renunciation is not consonant
(Name
and
(N.N.)
of institute as civilly incorporated)
Witnessed that the parties to this agreement,
in consideration for temporal care and support,
necessary medical care and expenses, and proper
(corburial services, to be rendered by the
to me for as long as I remain
poration)
a member of the said corporation, I,
hereby GRANT, SELL, AS(N.N.)
(corporation)
SIGN, AND SET OVER to the
, a corporation organized and existing under
(the State
and by virtue of the laws of
of ... )

for

(e.g., educational and re-

purposes, and its successors and asligious)
signs, all of my property, of every kind and
nature wheresoever situated, of which I am now
possessed or to which I may hereafter become
entitled, through purchase, gift, devise, or inheritance or in any other manner, and to be used by
for such purposes
(corporation)
said
as in its discretion it may deem best.
In witness whereof, the parties hereto have
day of
hereunto set their hands this
, in this agreement first
19
above written.
(N.N. of party)
(N.N. of representative of
(Seal)
corporation)
29 For a more extensive treatment of this subject,
vide O'Brien, loc. cit.

with the concept of a solemn vow of poverty nor can it be tolerated without authorization of the Holy See.
The Acceptance of Legacies
A legacy may be defined as "a testamentary disposition, contained in a will,
making a donation bequeathed by a competent testator, to be executed after his
death by his heir or some other person
designated by him, at the demand of the
legatee or of the law." : 0 Or, again, it is "a
devise or bequest in the nature of an offer
and vests in the donee only on his acceptance thereof." '31 A legacy, therefore, partakes of the nature of an offer which is
considered as taking place at the death of
the testator. Prior to the death of the testator, the legacy should be classified as "a
record of a future offer of a gift." But if a
religious is not obliged to accept a gift
from a living donor, he should a Jortiori
be permitted to dissuade a donor from
making the future offer of a gift. Even
though he thereby accomplishes his own
exclusion as a legatee, he does not act
contrary to his vow of poverty. The liceity
of his action must be determined in accordance with other standards. Accordingly, he
must decide whether his action can be reconciled with the virtue of poverty as well
as with the virtue of piety towards his community, and whether it is in keeping with
the particular law of his institute. Certainly
his action of bringing about his own exclusion as a legatee is permissible at civil law
since the latter even permits him to reject
the legacy. Thus, in the absence of particular legislation, it appears that a religious
relying upon his own judgment may law.10

Hannan, The Canon Law of Wills, n. 83, foot-

note 86.
3' 96 C.J.S., Wills, 1148.
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fully refuse a legacy during the testator's
lifetime or dissuade him from naming him
a legatee.
The entire question of legacies in relation to the vow of poverty and the rights
of religious in specific instances is by no
means clear in the works of the authors
who discuss wills or legacies. None of them
considers legacies in the light of the civil
law of the United States. It appears to the
writer, however, that a similar conclusion
can be drawn in regard to the rejection of a
legacy by a religious, even when it becomes
known only after the death of the testator,
unless particular law prohibits such a refusal on the part of the legatee. A legacy,
as it is understood in the United States
today, is like the offer of a gift on the part
of the testator with the offer becoming effective at the moment of death of the testator. It would be very strange indeed if a
testator, while still alive, lacked the authority to oblige a religious to accept a gift and,
nevertheless, could oblige him morally to
do so after his death through the simple
expedient of naming him a legatee. This is
particularly true when the civil law instrument itself lacks this binding force. Although civil law distinguishes legacies of
land from other bequests in so far as vesting and particular formalities are concemed, it ultimately concedes the legatee a
right to accept or reject a legacy.
Canonists differ regarding the vesting of
an inheritance and the question whether
acceptance is required. Wernz holds that
the legatee becomes the owner at the death
of the testator 8 2 Vermeersch-Creusen, 33

Cocchi,3 4 and Vromant"5 demand acceptance as a condition for the inheritance to
vest. Hannan believes this position to be
preferable. 3 In so far as a legatee with a
vow of poverty is concerned, this opinion
is more reasonable in regard to his rights.
Again, the right of a religious to reject a
legacy can be urged on the basis of the
testator's intention and purpose when he
makes a legacy. He utilizes this instrument
in the light of his understanding of it in
our civil law. For him, the legacy is a
recorded offer of a gift which is to be effective after his death. The testator, therefore, stands before the law as one who
intends to confer a gift upon a legatee
through the legacy. Ownership does not
pass, however, through the mere offer of a
gift. At the death of the testator, the ownership of the gift is sequestered in the custody of the law and can be accepted or
rejected as any other gift. Even when a
portion of an estate devolves by operation
of law upon an individual, it still remains
within his apacity to accept or reject it.
Although the civil law might consider ownership of a devise (land grant) as vesting
immediately, the legatee still has the right
to accept or reject it. In view of this reasoning, it appears that a legatee who is a religious may - in the absence of particular
legislation - accept or reject a legacy before or after the death of a testator, provided he has placed no action indicative of
acceptance. His action of rejection is not
an act of ownership and, therefore, is permissible despite his vow of poverty.
If acceptance is once indicated, the reli34

Wernz, lus Decretalium, Vol. III (ed. altera;
Romae-Prati, 1908), p. 286.
33 Epitome luris Chnonici, Vol. II (MechliniaeRomae, 1940), n. 834.
32

1.962

Commentarium in Codicem luris Canonici ad

Usum Scholarum, Lib. III (Romae: Marietti,
1932), p. 295, n. 189.
35 De Bonis Ecclesiae Temporalibus (3d ed.;
Brussels, 1953), pp. 138-139.
86 The Canon Law of Wills, n. 84.
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gious legatee must be considered as having
acquired the legacy. He is then restricted
in his actions regarding the legacy, since he
is obliged by the vow of poverty and its
regulations. Thus, a simply professed religious must obey the laws governing patrimony if the legacy comes to him as a
person rather than as a religious. If it is
acquired by him in his status as a religious,
7
the ownership is acquired by the institute.
On the other hand, if the legatee is solemnly professed, the legacy is acquired for
the institute; his civilly recognized contract
with the institute will insure the protection
of its rights.
Contracts for Personal Services
As a means of protecting a religious
institute from possible claims for remuneration to a former member, an agreement
"7 Can. 580, §2.

recognized by civil law should be formulated between the institute and each member whereby the member releases the
institute from any such claims in the future.
Such an agreement should be recommended in all religious institutes as a protection from future law suits against the
institute.
A contractual agreement was mentioned
above as a suitable instrument whereby a
candidate for solemn vows is enabled to
turn over all future acquisitions to his institute in consideration for his support and
temporal care. A similar agreement can be
established in the form of a civilly recognized instrument whereby the religious, in
consideration for his support and temporal
care in the institute, waives all claims for
salary or compensation at any future date.
In this way, possible legal difficulties in the
future will be forestalled.
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